In the first part of this article the relationship between central and provincial govern ments as elaborated in the Constitution will be described. In the second part the regulation of the division of total government income between the different layers of government will be looked into and a conclusion on the above question will be arrived at.
I. National -Provincial relationship as established in the Constitution
2. The Republic of South Africa is a composite state. The component parts of the state are called Provinces. The 9 Provinces are enumerated in the Constitution (1996)1 of South Africa2. The Constitution does not typify the relationship between central and provincial government in words like "federal" or "commonwealth". It indicates this relationship quite neutrally with the word "sphere of Government". So Section 40,1 reads: "In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.". The Constitution is the source of all authority in the Republic of South Africa. (S.
2) It may be amended by a majority of two thirds of the national parliament plus a two thirds majority in the senate, which is called the National Council of Provinces. A Constitutional Court may review every law on its consistency with the Constitution.
The Principles o f 1993
3. The current Constitution of 1996 was preceded by the post-Apartheid Interim Con stitution of 19933, which presents the political agreement of the South African popu lation on the main characteristics of the constitutional design of the Republic. The 1993 Constitution was to be replaced by a new Constitution to be drafted by a Con stitutional Assembly. The characteristics are spelled out in 34 Constitutional Principles laid down in Annex 4 of the Interim Constitution. The Constitutional Principles are of a lasting interest. Section 74 of the Interim Con stitution of 1993 provides that no amendment or repeal of the Constitutional Princi ples shall be permissible. The new Constitution had to be certified by the Constitu tional Court as complying with the Constitutional Principles before it might be signed into law by the President. (S. 72 of the 1993 Interim Constitution).
4. In the Principles democratic representation on all levels of government, national, provincial and local is prescribed.
More than a quarter of the 34 Principles deal with the powers of the Provinces in rela tion to the powers of the national government. In the Principles the Constitutional Assembly is given the task of defining the powers and functions of national and provincial governments. Proposals for amendment of the powers of the provinces as defined in the new Constitution were only to be sub mitted after the provincial legislatures had been consulted.. (Principle XVIII) The national government of South Africa and the provincial governments were to have exclusive and concurring competences as well as the power to perform functions for other levels of government on a delegation or agency basis.( XIX)
The general Principle for allocating powers and functions is that each level of gov ernment is to function effectively. The allocation had also to be conducive to finan cial viability and an effective public administration which recognised the need for and promoted national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and acknowledged cul tural diversity. (XX) As regards the allocation of powers between the national and provincial governments the following supplementary criteria were to apply.( XXI, 1 -5) When the maintenance of economic union or of internal security is involved or when unreasonable action by one provincial government damages other provinces or the country as a whole the national government is empowered to intervene. Moreover the national government will act in matters of national economic policy, in the Republic's common market matter, in foreign affairs or where essential national standards are involved. Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function the legislative power over that function is to be allocated predominantly if not wholly to the national government.
5. As regards provincial powers, the Constitutional Assembly got an either/or guide line in the Principles. The Provincial governments were to have powers allotted either exclusively or concurrently with the national government, inter alia -for the purposes of provincial planning and development and the rendering of services; and -in respect of aspects of government dealing with specific socio-economic and cultural needs and the general well-being of the inhabitants of the province (XXI, 6). The regulation of local government is left to parliamentary statutes or provincial leg islation or both. But a framework for local government powers was to be set out in the Constitution. (XXIV) So, the order to the Constitutional Assembly regarding the province's powers is rather vague: The provincial governments had to be empowered in matters concerning their town and country planning as well as concerning the well-being of their populations, but the possibility of the national government to step in had to be left open. However, Principle XXII mentions that the national government will not exercise its powers (be it exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the integrity of the provinces. The Principles provide expressly for co-operation between national and provincial governments by stating that where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers should be allocated concurrently to the national government and the provincial governments. (XXI, 7)
The dominant position of the national government is underlined in Principle XXIII which mentions that in case of a dispute between the national and a provincial gov ernment about concurrent powers which cannot be resolved by a court on the basis of the Constitution, precedence is to be given to the powers of the national government. So, it seemed to be the intention that the reserve-powers would rest with the national government.
6. The Principles contain three prescriptions regarding finance. -National, provincial and local government shall have fiscal power.(XXV) -Moreover each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally, so as to ensure that provinces and local gov ernments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated to them.(XXVI) So, equity is to be related to the provision of basic services plus the execution of functions allocated.
-An advisory committee is to be established which will weigh the share each Prov ince is to have in this division of nationally collected revenue taking into account a number of factors, that is to say the national interest, economic disparities between the provinces as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative respon sibilities and other legitimate interests.(XXVII) In this so-called Financial and Fiscal Commission each province is to be represented.
The 1996 Constitution and the Provinces 7. The Constitutional Assembly adopted a text for the new Constitution on 8 May 1996. This text was submitted to the Constitutional Court for certification. In its judgement of 14 September the Court concluded that the constitutional text could not be certified as complying fully with the Constitutional Principles4. The main focus of its judgement was on provincial government matter, more specifically on the ques tion whether the constitutional text provided for the required legitimate provincial autonomy. Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly amended the submitted text substantially and adopted the new version on 11 October 1996, which was then again laid before the Constitutional Court. Considering this amended text the Court found that the powers and functions of the Provinces were still less or inferior to those accorded in the Interim Constitution but that the disparity was not substantial. Therefore the Court concluded in its judgement of 4 December 1996 that the Constitution did indeed com ply with the Constitutional Principles5. The certification of the text thus being ob tained the President of the Republic signed the new Constitution into law on the 11th of December 1996.
8. In the 1996 Constitution the concurrent and the exclusive powers of the provinces are enumerated in attached Schedules 4 and 5 respectively. The Schedules are amend able in the same way as the Constitution itself, that is by a two thirds majority in the national Parliament and in the National Council of Provinces. The powers of the national government are not put in an attachment. Section 44,1 a ii of the Constitution provides that the national Parliament may legislate on any matter, including the matters allocated to the provinces under Schedule 4 but excluding those under Schedule 5. However, Parliament may even intervene in those exclusive pro vincial powers -in order to maintain national security, economic unity, and essential national stan dards, -in order to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services, or -to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the in terest of another province or to the country as a whole. (S. 44,2)
The first power of a province is to pass a constitution and to amend it. (S. 104,1) Amendments have to follow the same procedure as amendments of the national Con stitution, that is by a 2/3 majority in the provincial legislature. A provincial constitution may not be inconsistent with the national constitution. (S. 143,1) A province is, however, expressly empowered to differ in its provincial legis- The provincial constitution has moreover to be certified by the national Constitutional Court to be in conformity with the national Constitution before it may enter into force.(S.144,2) As long as a province is without its own constitution it can manage adequately on the default provisions for provincial governments provided in the na tional Constitution6.
Provincial power over local government 9. The Constitution allots provincial government the task to establish municipalities and to provide by legislative or other measures for the monitoring and support of local government. (S. 155,6a) A South African Province shares its power over the local level of government in many instances concurrently with the national government like for instance in re gional planning and development, in urban and rural development and welfare serv ices, in environment, health services and housing. Also some parts of chapters in which the Constitution reserves exclusive competence for the national government, some powers may be left to provincial government like police, language policy and media services. Next to that the province has competence over a list of local govern ment matter over which it has the exclusive right to control (Schedule 5, part B). The control of other local matter it has to share with the national Government (Schedule 4, part B). The competence in any matter concerning local government not mentioned in the Constitution rests with the national Government (S. 164). The provincial government is empowered to intervene when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil a obligation in terms of legislation (S. 139,1). However, the interven tion needs the approval of the member of the national Cabinet responsible for local government within 14 days (S. 139,2a) . Also the National Council of Provinces has to approve the intervention within 30 days after its first sitting after the intervention (S. 139,2c).
Conflict o f laws
10. The national Constitution(1996) provides for an extensive regulation concerning conflict between national and provincial legislation. It divides possible conflicts in two cases: a) the ones between national and provincial legislation in areas of concurrent power, and b) conflicts between national legislation and the provisions of provincial constitutions.
Ad a). In the case of conflict of e x i s t i n g legislation in the areas of concurrent powers the effectiveness of regulation is the determining criterion for the prevalence of national power over provincial .When uniformity is required as in the case of norms and standards, frameworks or national policies the higher effectiveness of na 6 Only the province of the Western Cape succeeded in establishing a provincial constitution. It was certified in an unanimous judgement by the Constitutional Court on 18 November 1997 and was signed into law on 15 January 1998. An attempt by KwaZulu-Natal to establish a provincial constitution was defeated in the Constitutional Court. by judgement of 6 September 1996. The attempt has not been pursued. (KwaZulu-Natal Certifi cation Case 1996 (11)BCLR1419(CC)) tional legislation is presumed by the Constitution .(S. 146, 2 & 3). In other cases pro vincial law prevails. When the question is the necessity of a n e w national law instead of e x i s t i n g provincial law and that dispute is submitted to a court, the court has to have due re gard to the rejection or approval of such legislation by the National Council of Prov inces. If a court is not involved in the solution of the question the provincial power is made fully dependent on the position of the National Council of Provinces (S. 146,6). Ad b). As regards a conflict of law between existing national legislation and a provi sion of a provincial constitution national legislation prevails in general. (S. 147,1)
If a dispute cannot be resolved by a court the national legislation prevails over the provincial legislation or constitution (S. 148).
11. The constitutional chapter on the regulation of conflicts of law finishes by laying down a rule of interpretation. It prescribes in Section 150 that every court when con sidering apparent conflicts of law between national and provincial law has to prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation or the Constitution that avoids a con flict over any alternative interpretation that results in a conflict. From this chapter it may be clear that the drafters of the Constitution (1996) wanted to set borders to the legal process in favour of the political arena. This is also being made most clear in Section 41 in the Chapter on co-operative government where one may find the constitutional order to the courts to refer a dispute back to the organs of state involved when a court is not convinced that all other remedies are exhausted.
The role o f the provinces in national legislation
12. The South African legislature is bi-cameral and consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The National Assembly has 400 members elected on the basis of a national common voters roll and of proportional representation. The National Council of Provinces is composed of a single delegation of ten delegates from each province, in total 90 members. In a provincial delegation four delegates are special delegates and six are permanent delegates. The special delegates are the premier of the province, or any member of the provincial legislature designated by the premier either generally or for any specific business be fore the National Council of Provinces, and three other special delegates.(S. 60) The introduction of special delegates in the composition of the provincial delegations allows for a measure of flexibility in the political decision making and for the mobili sation of a particular expertise when needed.
The political parties active in a province are entitled to be represented in the delega tion of the province. The number of seats to be allotted to each party are to be calcu lated by a formula given in the Constitution itself. (Schedule 3 B of the Constitution) The provincial legislature has then to decide how many of each party's delegates are to be special delegates, and how many permanent delegates. It will also appoint the permanent delegates nominated by the parties. These decisions have to be taken within 30 days after the results of the election for the provincial legislature become public. Permanent representatives in the Council chosen from among the members of the provincial legislature may attend the meetings of that legislature but lose the right to vote. They remain member of the Council until a new election for the province they represent is held. The three special delegates are appointed, as and when required, by the legislature of the province from amongst its members. Their designation has to have the concur rence of the premier of the province and of the leaders of the political parties entitled to special delegates. Participation of minority parties in the provincial delegations is to be ensured. (S. 61) So, the members of the National Council of Provinces are not directly chosen by the population in the provinces, they are representatives of political parties. All the political parties represented in the National Council of Provinces at the mo ment are also represented in the National Assembly. On both levels the African Na tional Congress party (ANC) is in the majority. However, to attain a two thirds ma jority in decisionmaking the ANC needs the co-operation of an other political party.
13. The National Council of Provinces has to consider all national legislation and may amend or reject it. It may moreover initiate or prepare legislation falling within the functional area of Schedule 4 (= concurrent powers) or other legislation concerning institutional rules enumerated in Section 76 (3) 7 of the Constitution (S. 68). It may not initiate or prepare Money Bills8. The constitutional rules for the national legislation process provides for t w o sepa rate procedures, one for an ordinary bill that does not affect the provinces and one for an ordinary bill that does affect provinces. The difference between the two procedures becomes visible in case of a disagreement between both houses about a submitted bill.
In the case of an ordinary a bill n o t affecting provinces rejection by the Council only necessitates the National Assembly to reconsider the bill which it approved ear lier. In these cases the National Council of Provinces acts as a consultative body. Their "no" may only result in procedural delay. In these cases each delegate in a pro vincial delegation casts his/her vote as a separate member and questions are decided by simple majority in the house.(S. 75)
As regards ordinary bills a f f e c t i n g the provinces, each province has one vote and agreement is reached when at least five provinces vote in favour. A bill is sup posed to affect provinces when it falls within the functional area of Schedule 4 (= concurrent powers) or concerns certain institutional or procedural matters (see foot note 7).
In the case of a conflict between the Council and the Assembly a Mediation Commit tee becomes involved. The Committee consists of 9 Members elected by the National Assembly out of their midst, and 9 delegates of the Council each representing a Province. Co-operative Government 14. In the regulation of the division of powers between national government and pro vincial governments the position of the Provinces is less clearly guaranteed because of the rather open-ended definitions of central government power. This fits in with the intention of the drafters of the Constitution (1996) to provide for co-operative gov ernment. In the Constitution a whole chapter -be it a short one -is dealing with this theme. (Chapter 3, Sections 40-41) In it the three "spheres of government" national, provincial and local are defined as distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.
As first principles of co-operation a few aims are mentioned which concern typical central government care, thereby binding the provinces to respect central government action. They are: a. to preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic; b. to secure the well-being of the people of the Republic; c. to provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole. Then a few general principles are mentioned underlining the distinctiveness of each sphere: a. to respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres; b. not to assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; c. to exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of gov ernment in another sphere. And, thirdly, general principles for intergovernmental relations, that is relations be tween provinces and central government and between provinces mutually a. co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by b. i. fostering friendly relations; ii. assisting and supporting one another; iii. informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest; iv. co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; v. adhering to agreed procedures; and avoiding legal proceedings against one another. The Constitution allots expressly the supervision of provincial administration to the national executive. (S. 100) If the national executive is of the opinion that a province does not fulfil an executive obligation it may state to it the steps required to meet that obligation. The national ex ecutive may also take over the responsibility to fulfil that obligation but only when essential national standards, economic unity or national security are at stake or the interests of another province or the country become into danger. Such intervention has to be brought to the notice of the National Council of Provinces which has to approve within 30 days of its first session after the intervention. After approval the National Council has to keep the situation under surveillance.
As regards the executive power of the province, the Constitution charges the provin cial executive exclusively with the implementation of all provincial legisla t i o n^.^) Moreover, the provincial executive is responsible for the implementation of all national legislation mentioned under the Schedules 4 and 5 (= concurrent and exclusive provincial legislative power, see para. 8). Outside areas mentioned in those schedules the executive power of the Province has to be specified in the relevant Act. The executive power of the Province however is dependent on an important proviso: a province has executive power only to the extent that the province has the adminis trative capacity to assume effective responsibility. The national government has to assist the provinces to develop administrative capacity required for the effective exer- 
II . Intergovernmental financial relations
Introduction 16. In the second part of this article the regulation of the division of total government income between the different layers of government will be looked into in order to ex amine the constitutional and other legal guarantees for a sufficient income of the provinces which is congruent to their status under the constitution.
Chapter 13 of the Constitution of South Africa lays down the rules for an equitable division of revenue raised nationally between national, provincial and local spheres of government in order to provide basic services and exercise the functions allocated to each sphere. (S. 214,2d) The Constitution also prescribes that the provincial governments have to be involved in the procedure for the division or revenue (S. 214,2) and establishes the guidelines for that division(S. 214, 2 a -j) In the same chapter of the Constitution the general policy and the administrative re quirements for the annual budgeting on the national and the provincial levels are laid down and Treasury-control on the implementation of these rules is established.
The Fiscal and Financial Commission
17. In the decision making process concerning all these aspects of intergovernmental financial relations an important role -albeit a consultative one -is reserved for the Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC). The Commission is established by the Constitution itself. (S. 220) Its members are appointed by the President of the Republic of South Africa for a term of 5 years. They may be removed by the President on grounds of misconduct, inca pacity or incompetence. The Commission exists of a chairman and a vice-chairman who are full members, plus nine persons each representing a province and nominated by the Executive Council of a Province, and two persons nominated by organised local government plus nine other persons. The members need to have the appropriate expertise. The Commission is independent, only subject to the Constitution and the law, and has to be impartial. It is to make recommendations and advise the three spheres of government on issues that affect intergovernmental fiscal relations. Its main task is to advise on the re quirements for each level of government in the division of national income and thus contribute to the system of allocation.
The income position o f the Province
18. The income o f a province consists o f its own resources, and transfers from the na tional government. Provincial government is m oreover allowed to raise loans in accordance with reason able conditions determined by national legislation. (S. 230,1) This legislation has not been established up to now. The provinces have a certain leeway in this respect as the Constitution allows them loans for current expenditure for bridging purposes during the current fiscal year and to be repaid within 12 months. In practice all intergovern mental cash is co-ordinated through a national instance, the Corporation for Public Deposits which results in low er borrowing costs. As regards own resources: the South African Constitution empowers the Provinces to impose taxes. This taxing power is how ever rather limited. A provincial Government may not impose income tax, value added tax, general sales tax, rates on property or customs duties, it may impose flat rate surcharges on taxes nationally imposed except for the corporate income tax, value added tax, rates on property or customs duties. (S. 228) So only m inor tax sources are constitutionally allotted to the P ro v inces. The use o f the provincial taxing power may not prejudice national economic policies, inter-provincial economic activity or the national com mon market. Therefore a provincial tax has to be regulated by an Act o f the National Assembly. The following specific criteria are to be used for the horizontal division over the provinces: -fiscal capacity and efficiency o f a province and its developmental and other needs, -economic disparities w ithin and between provinces, -obligations in terms o f national legislation, -the need for predictable and stable allocations, and -the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies. The criteria have to be applied in an objective way. Section 227, 2 expressly forbids to deduct additional revenue raised by the provinces from their share o f revenue raised nationally. A province is obliged to raise for itself any resources that it requires -com mensurate with its fiscal capacity and tax baseand provide for such activity by a provision in its Constitution. (S. 227,4) The Constitution also provides that a province has to receive its equal share o f reve nue promptly and w ithout reduction (S. A large imbalance o f the income/expenditure ratio exists between the national and the provincial governments. National governm ent income is 2,3 times larger than its own expenditure. Total provincial own incom e is 27 tim es smaller than total provincial expenditure.
25. Income raised by the national governm ent consists for 98% out o f tax-revenues. Total resources shared between the three spheres o f governm ent include the proceeds o f borrowing by the national governm ent . 16 Act No. 1, 2001 From the total resources to be shared the costs o f national debts is firstly deducted on the basis o f S. 214, 2a o f the Constitution. To that, a general national reserve o f a R.2 billion. is added, which leaves an am ount o f R208,2 billion for division in the fiscal year 2001 -2002. The Division o f Revenue A ct 2001 allotted 40,2% o f this am ount to the national gov ernment, 56,6 % to the provincial governments and 3,1% to the local governments. The large provincial allocation is explained by the provincial responsibility for the im plem entation o f m ajor social services, including school education, health (primary care and hospitals), social grants and welfare services, housing and provincial roads.
The transfers to the provinces will for 11,3 % consist o f conditional grants and for 88,7 % o f equitable shares17.
Conditional grants
26. Conditional grants have been introduced into the intergovernmental financial sys tem by the 1998-1999 state budget. Their aim is to provide for national priorities in provincial budgets, to promote national norms and standards, to compensate for cross province externalities and to support capacity building and structural adjustment. 
Conditional grants may be divided in 2 classes:
Block grants = Specific grants Block grants are large allocations to com plem ent equitable share allocations. They are not earmarked for particular projects or spending programs. They are allotted to fund functions assigned to provinces. Sometimes they are allotted because provinces are not compensated adequately for spill-over effects through their equitable share. Block grants am ount to 50% o f conditional grants. There are 3 such block grants. Two block grants are administered by the national departm ent o f health providing general funding for hospitals in provinces in which central and/or academic hospitals are located, and also for funding professional training in health. The third block grant is the Supplementary Allocation Grant administered by the na tional Treasury. This grant is general budget support grant to encourage good budg eting and financial m anagement practices. This grant has also been used to consoli date various small grants and thus effected a streamlining in grant administration.
17 Budget Review 201, p. 242 Specific grants support specific priorities and interventions by the national govern ment. They require monitoring. Paym ent may be w ithheld on failure to comply with the conditions attached. There are tw o categories o f specific grants infrastructural = recurrent Infrastructural grants are allotted to assist provinces address infrastructure backlogs in education, health, roads and rural infrastructure and to repair flood damage.
These specific grants are administered by the national departments o f Health and o f Housing together with the national Treasury. The greater part o f these specific grants (61%) concerns Housing.
Other specific grants fund recurrent spending. The major grants in this category target im provem ent o f financial management. The grants are administered by the national departments o f Education, Health and Social Developm ent plus the national Treasury. The D epartm ent o f Provincial and Local Government allocates grants to provinces to enable them to support municipalities in financial difficulties.
Other recurrent grants provide for direct support for service delivery. Among these grants is a grant for im plem entation o f an integrated strategy for the prevention o f HIV/AIDS.
Development o f the conditional grants-system
28. The South African grants-system is still in development. It is part o f the restruc turing o f the state, which started under the Interim Constitution after the "A part heidsregime" The provincial governments needed time to becom e operational after 1994 when they had to merge 17 different administrations into 9 new ones. M oreover, since the budget-process was fully centralised before 1994, provinces had to develop capacity and expertise, and set up their data-collecting which is still not fully harmo nised. The money transferred under the conditional grants-system is being paid in accor dance with the paym ents schedules agreed between the national and provincial authorities. N either national nor provincial authorities monitored actual spending. Provinces have only recently set up their systems so that they can report more accu rately on grants spending. The task o f developing a system o f public finance, w hich provides transparency and accountability, falls on the national government which brought about the Public F i nance M anagem ent A ct in force since April 2000 (see also para 20). The Public F i nance M anagem ent A ct introduced accountability and formulates a framework for the management o f cash. It also established a system o f internal audit. The A ct sets re porting requirements for conditional grants thereby improving planning and manage ment. Provinces will have to prepare implementation plans based on a policy frame w ork w hich has to be provided by the national authorities. This policy-fram ework has to include objectives as well as criteria for allocations between provinces. The A ct is applicable to the national and provincial governments and the public entities under their ownership.
The main emphasis in the first year o f im plem entation has been on developing the ca pacity o f national and provincial authorities to im plem ent the Act. The equitable shares are allocated between the provinces (horizontal distribution) in accordance with a form ula based on the recom mendations o f the Financial and Fiscal Commission o f 1996 and first practised in the Fiscal year 1997/1998. The formula is a proportional distribution formula and attempts to capture the relative demand for services between provinces and to adjust for particular provincial circum stances. The form ula is updated every year taking into account changes in statistical data and is reviewed every 5 years.
Equitable shares
In accordance with the formula as implemented for the 2001/2002 fiscal y ear18 the total o f the provincial equitable share for the provinces has to be divided in 7 com po nents: -7% o f the am ount is set aside and divided over the provinces taking into account each province's share in population -5% is set aside and divided taking into account the institutional costs o f running the governm ent o f the province -41% o f the am ount is allotted to the provinces for education purposes and shared on the basis o f average school age populations and the num ber o f pupils -19% is a health share and is to be divided in proportion to the population without access to medical aid funding -17% is the social security com ponent to be divided over the provinces based on the estimated num ber o f people entitled to social security grants, w eighted by using a poverty index derived from the latest incom e and expenditure survey -3% is a backlog com ponent based on the distribution o f capital needs for schools and hospitals and o f a share in rural population -8% is the so-called economic output com ponent based on each province's share in total remuneration in the Republic o f South Africa. The amounts allotted to each province under each o f the seven com ponents are added, and their total is the equitable share o f that province. The provincial governments are free to spend the money allotted to them as their equitable share. The result o f the form ula19 is that more funds p er capita are allocated to the poorer, rural provinces. Four o f the nine provinces have an equitable share p er capita, w hich is below the average. The province o f Northern Cape receives the largest share p er capita, w hilst the low est equitable share p e r capita is allotted to Gauteng. The differ ence between the shares o f the two provinces is R. 13,3 billion, which is 12% o f the total equitable share allotted to the provinces in the vertical distribution. In those recom mendations the FFC introduced a costed norm approach for the distribution o f the equal shares over the provinces. The costed norm approach w ould have to be im plemented on funds needed by each provincial governm ent to provide for basic levels o f service in primary health and social security services and in basic education. Moreover, institutional costs had to be separated form the "net" costs and had to re main at the lowest possible level. The national governm ent w as only prepared to accept the costed norm approach as an analytical tool, w here sufficient data were available. It rejected -in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Budget Council -the approach as a criterion for decision on the amounts o f the equal shares. Their main objection was that the costed norm approach would destabilise patterns in a slowly growing experience in financial governance. M oreover this approach seemed less appropriate to determine budgetary priorities w hich require political judgem ent in m aking difficult trade-offs. The use o f the costed norm approach would undermine the principle o f provincial budgetary autonomy and w ould w eaken accountability. The difficulty o f setting the standards, w hich would have to be im plem ented on a na tional scale, would arise and the difficulty o f equating policy goals and standards. The national government also found that the process would create a bias in favour o f the services that could be more easily costed over the ones that could not. A very practical objection was that the crucial data required for developing cost estimates were not available20.
Final Conclusion
31. The 1996 Constitution presents the possibility for the Republic o f South Africa to develop into a federal state.
In the division o f powers the Constitution seems on first sight to favour the national governm ent by its accent on national programs and the necessary uniform ity o f legis lation. However, the rather broadly w orded definitions o f the powers allotted to each o f the three spheres o f government may w ork out in favour o f the provinces as well as in favour o f central government. M uch depends in this respect on the activity de ployed by the provinces and on the effectiveness o f the N ational Council o f Provinces acting on behalf o f the provinces and their autonomy. Especially the possibility that national law and provincial law may exist next to each other as long as inconsistency between both laws is avoided gives provincial legisla tures scope. The constitutional prescription that legislation with regard to a m atter which is rea sonably necessary for or accidental to the effective exercise o f a pow er concerning any matter in the area o f concurrent pow er is for all purposes legislation with regard to that m atter21, also offers the provinces leeway. In the national legislation procedure the provinces find guarantees to hold their own in the national legislature.
However, federation-building does not seem to be one o f the main policy targets in South African politics. The lack o f enthusiasm in most provinces to make use o f the possibility offered by the Constitution to adopt a provincial constitution is one in d ica The constitutional regulation o f the financial relations between the national and p ro vincial governments does not contribute to a budding out o f the South African pro v inces into federal states. The Constitution favours the central government by guaran teeing it the revenues o f the main tax-sources, the provinces only got the broad g u ar antee that the central government is to share its income with them. As regards the cri teria for this sharing the national financial needs are underlined as first priority. The fact that already 70% o f the expenditure o f the provinces is on social security benefits and public service salaries, w hich are all detailed in national legislation, indi cates the very restricted financial leeway provinces have, w hilst the push that the na tional governm ent showed in developing the grants system indicates its w illingness to use its financial superiority.
As regards the horizontal distribution over the 9 provinces, the disparity o f fiscal and economic capacity within and between provinces and the needs for stable and predict able allocations supporting developm ent are formulated as determining criteria. H ow ever, no fine-tuning o f the equalisation concept is undertaken in the Constitution or the law. Equalisation is mainly pursued by the national programs on health, education, housing etc. which are elaborated by the national government. The actual decision on the amounts allocated in the horizontal distribution is left to the national cabinet. Effectiveness as general principle for the sharing o f power (see para. 4) is thus easily made into an im portant guideline for the vertical and horizontal division o f revenue by the national government. Arbitrariness is, however, somewhat checked by the transparency o f the division o f revenue process brought about by all the explanations which have to be given in accordance with the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act.
As regards institutional aspects in the field o f public finance the Constitution created the Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC) which could -in co-operation with the National Council o f Provinces -create for itself a consultative but authoritative role in the annual division o f revenue. It seems too early to conclude on the success o f this formula. The FCC devised indeed the method which is used for the horizontal divi sion o f income but its standing in future is still an open question. The national legis lature created a counterbalance by the A ct w hich established the Budget Council. In this body the division o f revenue is actually negotiated between the national and p ro vincial treasurers before the decision is taken in the national cabinet (see para.22 ).
In short, the constitutional regulation o f the financial relations between the South Af rican provincial and central governments leaves the central governm ent ample op portunity to lim it provincial pow er and does not seem supportive for a developm ent o f the Republic o f South Africa into a federal state.
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